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Abstract 
In this paper, based on the experience of ten European countries, we 
study the relevance of seigniorage revenues in the recent past, and we 
speculate about their importance in the near future. We find that the 
members of the European community differ widely in the way they manage 
monetary policies. While for some of the European countries we could not 
identify any consistent seigniorage policy, for others seigniorage appears 
to have been an important component of their financing policies. This lack 
of consensus about the role of monetary policies is a potential source of 
conflict in designing common exchange rate policies. 
A formal analysis of the current status of the finances of the 
governments of the ten European countries also revealed that several of 
them are now following budget policies that are potentially incompatible 
with their long run solvency. This also represents a major obstacle toward 
monetary unification on exchange rate stability. Member countries will be 
faced with quite different needs for revenues and eliminating a 




One of the most debated problems in Europe today is the definition of 
the strategy for achieving monetary integration. The European Monetary 
System (EMS) was established as an intermediate step toward such 
unification. The EMS has produced increasing stability in exchange rates, 
but this success has been facilitated by the existence of widespread 
capital controls that have discouraged speculative activities. The process 
of financial liberalization which is now in progress, while certainly 
beneficial in other respects, could seriously undermine the solidity of the 
EMS. One of the main reasons for concern is the uneven status of the 
government finances of the member countries. Exchange rate systems like 
the EMS impose monetary discipline that may be too tight for countries that 
are struggling with large public deficits. 
The close link between budget decisions and the exchange rate is 
analyzed in Grilli (1988). There it is shown that the financing of 
government expenditures may be incompatible with a fixed exchange rate and 
that, historically, this incompatibility has been one of the main causes of 
exchange rate crises. According to this point of view, inflation is an 
essential element of an optimal taxation program. Therefore, waiving the 
discretionary power over money supply decisions (as implied by a fixed 
exchange rate system) without, at the same time, surrendering the 
sovereignty over fiscal policies, may not be a credible arrangement. 
Similar concerns have been expressed by others, e.g. Dornbush (1987) and 
Giavazzi (1987). Dornbush (1987) suggests that, given the probable 
existance of large discrepancies in seigniorage needs among the European 
countries, a more realistic exchange rate arrangement would be a crawling 
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peg. In this system, the rates of depreciation would be set to meet 
national budgetary requirements. 
Whether or not these are critical considerations is ultimately an 
empirical issue. In particular, it is important to establish whether 
revenue needs have indeed affected the way in which inflation has been 
determined in the past, and if they are likely to be important in the 
future. 
In order to address these issues, we first present a simple theory of 
seigniorage and income taxation, which is related to pioneering work by 
Phelps (1973), and which has been recently revived by Mankiw (1987), 
Poterba and Rotemberg (1987) and Grilli (1988), among others. We derive 
the time series properties of seigniorage and income taxes. It is shown 
that, if the government behaves optimally, the tax rate and the rate of 
inflation should be martingale processes. Futhermore, the tax rate and the 
inflation rate should be cointegrated. We test these implications for ten 
European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and U.K.). 
Next, we analyze the effects of three important elements on the 
results. First, we investigate the consequences of the development of 
financial markets on the demand for monetary base. Second, we study the 
constraint imposed on seigniorage policies by the existence of a fixed 
(semi-fixed) exchange rate system. Finally, in order to evaluate the 
potential future needs for revenues in general, and seigniorage in 
particular, we analyze the government budget situation of the ten countries 
by formally testing for their long run solvency. 
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2. A Common Argument for Uncommon Currencies: The Inflation Tax1 
2.1 A Simple Closed Economy Model of Optimal Seigniorage 
For an exchange rate system to be reasonably stable it is necessary 
that the inflation rates of the participating countries do not diverge in 
the long run. Therefore, it is important to understand the criteria 
according to which monetary growth is determined in the various countries, 
and if they imply converging rates of inflation. Table 1 presents the 
average rates of inflation in selected sub-periods since 1950 for the ten 
European countries. The average rate of inflation has increased in all of 
the countries after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. In the 
period of flexible exchange rates between 1971 and 1978 the rate of 
inflation has been, on average, highest. While in the Eighties the rate of 
inflation has been, on average, lower than in the Seventies, the 
cross-country variance has been the highest. Why is inflation diverging 
across the countries, and is this pattern likely to continue? 
There are several ways of modelling the process that generates 
inflation. In the most popular models the authorities, following a 
Phillips curve inspired policy, try to use inflation for stabilization 
purposes. More recently, game theoretic applications of this idea, 
initiated by Barro and Gordon (1983), have pointed out that, if the 
authorities cannot credibly commit to time inconsistent policies, the 
equilibrium will be characterized by high (sub-optimal) rates of inflation. 
Since the equilibrium inflation rate depends on the particular structure of 
the economy and on the objective function of the authorities, this approach 
could potentially explain cross-country differences in inflation. 
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A different but not necessarily alternative approach investigates the 
potential connection between inflation and government financing decisions. 
This way of looking at the problem, while not novel, has recently received 
renewed attention, perhaps because budgetary problems have become the 
central issue in the policy debate. According to this approach, the proper 
way of looking at inflation is from a public finance point of view. Money 
creation is a source of revenues (seigniorage) for the government. One 
important reason for inflating the economy (the most important according to 
this approach), is to finance the primary deficit. To understand inflation 
we have to analyze the behavior of budget variables, like expenditure and 
other sources of revenues (taxes). Table 2 presents the average government 
expenditure-output ratios for selected periods. As was the case for 
inflation, expenditure has increased on average in all of the countries 
after 1970. Also, in the Eighties, both the average expenditure-output 
ratio and its cross country variance has been higher than in the Seventies. 
These figures seem to be compatible with a public finance-oriented 
explanation of inflation. In order to construct a more formal way of 
testing the validity of this theory, we present a simple benchmark model, 
close in spirit to the work on optimal inflation tax by Phelps (1973), and 
which has been recently used by Mankiw (1987) and Grilli (1988). 
The basic structure of the model is straight forward. The 
government's problem is to choose the optimal mix of distortionary taxes 
and deficit to finance an exogenous and stochastic stream of expenditure. 
Formally, the problem can be expressed as: 
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P4 min Et I 
00 
(Ji {cl(Tt+j) + C2(St+j)}j=OTt,St 
00 00 
s.t. I (1!r)j {Tt+j + st+j} I ~j Gt~ + (l+r) Bt-l 
j=O j=O 
where r is the (assumed) constant real interest rate, Tt are income tax 
revenues (at time t), Gt are real government expenditures, Bt is real 
government debt, St is seigniorage. c 1 (·) and c 2
(-) are convex functions, 
which model the potential welfare loss associated with income taxation and 
inflation, respectively. The costs of income taxation are associated with 
its distortionary effects on labor supply and with the administrative costs 
of collection. The costs of raising seigniorage are related to the 
distortionary effects of inflation. These potentially involve both 
reductions in desired cash holdings (and the consequent negative effects 
transactions) and unwelcome redistributive effects. 2 It is assumed that the 
government selects Tt and St in order to minimize the expected present 
discounted value of the distortions introduced by taxation. This type of 
model produces the tax smoothing result obtained by Barro (1979). Taxes 
(both income tax and inflation) are set on the basis of permanent 
government expenditure, with temporary deviations from this level being 
financed by issuing debt. 
Even if not evident from the way we formulated the problem, the 
optimal policy implied by P-1 may not be time consistent. As originally 
pointed out by Calvo (1978), the difficulty arises because inflation may be 
distortionary ex-ante, but not ex-post. This will be the case, for 
example, if the only costs associated with inflation are its negative 
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effects on (forward looking) money demand. Ex-post, i.e. after individuals 
made their decisions about their cash holdings, the monetary authorities 
may deviate from the "ex-ante optimal" rate of inflation, thus increasing 
seigniorage without inducing a reduction in cash holdings. In the rest of 
this paper we will be discussing the properties of the optimal policy, 
without explicitly addressing time consistency issues. This 
simplification, however, is not crucial to the analysis. First, for some 
of the countries under consideration, credibility of the monetary 
authorities is not a serious issue. Second, as it has been recently shown 
by Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987), there exist very simple schemes 
that may resolve the basic time inconsistency problem for this class of 
models. Third, and most important, Poterba and Rotemberg (1987) have shown 
that, if the costs of inflation also involve ex-post components (as in the 
case of redistribution effects), the time consistent solution has basically 
the same time series properties as the one we will be discussing below. 
If we make the simplifying assumption that the two cost functions are 
quadratic in Tt and St, i.e. 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 




The first implication of the theory is that income tax revenues and 
seigniorage should be martingale processes, independently of the process 
generating government expenditure. This is, of course, a result analogous 
to the random walk property of consumption derived by Hall (1978). Notice 
that the first order conditions imply a linear relationship between 
seigniorage and tax revenues: 
(2.5) 
Quite intuitively, the relative importance of seigniorage in an optimal 
taxation package depends positively on the cost of using income taxes (b )1 
and negatively on the cost of using monetization (b ).2 
The model also produces a positive relationship between revenues and 
expenditures. By taking the expectation operator, Et' across the budget 
constraint, and substituting the first order conditions: 
(where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal 




By making explicit assumptions about the stochastic process driving 
expenditure, Gt' we can derive from (2.5) and (2.6) expressions for Tt and 
St which are functions of observables only. For example, under the 
assumption that Gt is a random walk, we obtain: 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
Taxes and seigniorage are constant proportions of expenditure inclusive of 
interest payments. If we introduce an additive random error in the 
theoretically exact relationships (2.5), the stochastic implication of this 
theory is that St and Tt must be cointegrated, with the constant of 
integration being a measure of the relative cost of income tax and 
seigniorage. A similar argument holds for the expressions (2.8) and (2.9) 
which imply that taxes and seigniorage must be cointegrated with government 
expenditure (inclusive of interest payments). Notice that, in this special 
case, since all shocks to Gt are perceived to be permanent, the fiscal 
authorities will never issue any new debt. However, the properties derived 
above do not depend on the assumption that Gt is a random walk. Government 
expenditure may follow a more general non-stationary process of the form: 
9 
and the same cointegration property would still hold. 
3 In this (more 
general) case, government debt will have a role. 
It can be argued that a more appealing way to model the distortionary 
effect of taxation and the choice of policy instruments is not in terms of 
total income tax and seigniorage, but in terms of the income tax rate and 
the rate of inflation. This can be done by properly respecifying the 
model. For example, assume that the cost functions have the form: 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
where rt is the (average) income tax rate and nt is the inflation rate. 
We can reformulate P-1 as: 
00 
P-2 min Et I (¼.) j[(a + 
2
b 1 r 2 . ) Y . + (a + b
2
2 n 2 . ) Y .l
l+r 1 t+J t+J 2 t+J t+J
rt,nt j=O 
00 
s.t. I (¼.) j[r .Y l I (¼.)j t+J 1. + n .m . 00 G .+(l+r)B1+r t+J t+J t+J t+J . 0 1+r t-j=O J= 
where mt are real cash balances and we have used ntmt as a measure of 
seigniorage. 4 If we assume that money demand is a constant fraction of 
output: mt= myt we obtain: 
(2.12) 
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This model, therefore, predicts that rt and ~t must be cointegrated. Also, 
it is approximately true that: 5 
b2 Gt + rBt-l (2.13)rt 2b1
m +b yt2 
b
1




The tax rate and the rate of inflation should be cointegrated with 
agovernment expenditure (inclusive of interest payments) expressed as 
onfraction of output. Note, also, the effect of the velocity of money 
seigniorage and income taxation. Countries with low velocity (high m) will 
find it optimal to have a relatively high rate of inflation. 
As pointed out by Mankiw (1987), allowing for the velocity to be a 
function of inflation would not change the basic results. In particular, 
the positive correlation between seigniorage and taxes would still be 
present. Suppose, for example, that mt= (a-{3/ ~t) yt. Then, from the 
2 
first order conditions of P-2 we derive: 
d~t 
which implies that--> 0. 
drt 
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2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Results from Previous Analysis 
The insight that, in an environment like the one described above, the 
inflation rate and the tax rate should be positively correlated, is the 
basic idea behind recent analyses by Mankiw (1987), and Poterba and 
Rotemberg (1987). Mankiw (1987) argues that the theory of optimal 
seigniorage performs reasonably well in explaining the behaviour of nominal 
interest rates and inflation in the postwar United States. His conclusion 
is based on the finding that the inflation rate (and the nominal interest 
rate) and the average tax rate are indeed positively correlated, and that 
the regression coefficients are significant, on the basis of the standard 
T--statistics. Poterba and Rotemberg (1987), on the other hand, raise some 
doubts about the generality of the theory. They extend Mankiw's analysis 
to Japan, Germany, France and the U.K., and they find that a significant 
positive correlation is present only in the Japanese data. 
A fundamental problem with both analyses is that they do not take into 
Theyconsideration the full range of empirical implications of the theory. 
look only for a positive correlation between inflation and tax rate, but 
they do not inquire about their unit root and cointegration properties. 
More importantly, the very nature of these properties, i.e. the fact that 
inflation and taxes should have a unit root, may invalidate the kind of 
tests used in those papers. It is well known, in fact, that standard 
regression techniques cannot be used in presence of non-stationary 
variables. In general, the standard T--statistics do not have a limiting 
distribution and cannot be used to test the significance of regression 
coefficients. In this case, the proper approach is to test for the 
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existence of cointegration among the non-stationary variables. We refer 
the reader to Engle and Grenger (1987) for a discussion of the topic. 
in two steps. First, we test whetherOur empirical analysis proceeds 
the various measures of seigniorage and income taxes have a unit root, a 
necessary condition if a country is behaving according to the simple theory 
test for the existence of cointegration amongoutlined above. Second, we 
revenue variables and between revenues and expenditures. All the data are 
drawn from the International Monetary Fund International Financial 
The sample size varies acrossStatistics, and are all in logarithms. 
countries, and it is the longest possible in the period 1948-1986. 
Consequently, it varies from a maximum of 38 observations (for Ireland and 
the U.K.) to a minimum of 22 (for Spain). For all the other countries it 
is between 30 and 35 observations. Expenditure and revenue data have been 
expressed in real terms using the GDP deflator of the respective country. 
In the Appendix we provide a more detailed description of the data sources. 
Unit Root Tests 
We conducted a variety of unit root tests, including tests proposed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979), Dickey and Fuller (1983), Phillips (1987) and 
Phillips and Perron (1987). Since the results of the different tests were 
very similar, we report only the Z (Phillips (1987), the Z and Z a µ T 
are Table 4(Phillips and Perron (1987)) tests, which presented in Table 3, 
and Table 5. The basic difference between the three tests is that the Z a 
test is designed for a pure autoregressive process, the Z µ 
for an 
anautoregressive process with a drift, and Z 
T 
for autoregressive process 
with a drift and time trend. The exact form of the null hypotheses and of 
the alternatives for these tests are given at the bottom of the tables. 
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Table 3 tests for the existence of a unit root in the total tax 
revenues and average tax rate series. The results of the same test for the 
total government expenditure and the expenditure/GDP ratio (gt) series, are 
reported in Table 5. Not surprisingly, for all the countries both Gt and 
gt are non-stationary in the sample periods. For Greece, the existence of 
a unit root in Gt is rejected against the alternative of a linear time 
trend at a more than 97.5% confidence level. The same general 
non-stationarity is true for Tt and rt. A notable exception is the U.K., 
for which the average tax rate appears to be stationary. 
Table 4 presents the same battery of tests for total seigniorage, and 
inflation. The unit root hypothesis for nt is never rejected when the 
alternative is a pure autoregressive process. The rejection is instead 
possible at the 99% confidence level for Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands 
when the althernative includes a drift, or a drift and a time trend. At a 
lower confidence level, rejection is also possible for Germany, which, in a 
sense, confirms the result by Poterba and Rotemberg (1987). Similar 
results hold for St: rejection of non-stationarity is possible for 
Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. 
Summarizing, as far as seigniorage is concerned, the evidence is 
somehow mixed. Specifically, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and possibly 
Germany and Denmark, may not be satisfying the unit root condition. The 
unit root implication for the income tax rate receive wider support: only 
the U.K. may be violating this condition. Finally, the assumption of unit 
root processes for government spending, made to derive the cointegration 




In this section we test for the existence of cointegration between 
siegniorage (inflation) and expenditures, and seigniorage (inflation) and 
taxes. Given the results of the unit root tests, including Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands in the analysis may not be 
appropriate. However, it is interesting to know whether the inflation rate 
and the tax rate have moved in the same direction, even if this finding may 
not be considered evidence that seigniorage was used in an efficient way. 
In fact, even if taxes are globally set at suboptimal levels, it could be 
the case that the relative weights of the different tax instruments are 
still choosen according to the above theory. For example, if a government 
decides, (for reasons exogenous to our model) to set the taxes at levels 
lower than what would be necessary to satisfy its budget constraint, the 
inflation rate and the income tax rate could be displaying a stationary 
behavior. Nonetheless, if it is using inflation for revenue purposes, it 
may still find it desirable to move the inflation rate and tax rate 
together. Moreover, the unit root tests used above, as well as the 
cointegration tests that we will be using below, are all asymptotic tests. 
Therefore, given the small sample size, the margin of error may be bigger 
than the one based on asymptotic distributions. 
In Table 6 we present the results of regressing total seigniorage on 
total taxes, and total seigniorage on total government expenditure 
(inclusive of interest payments). Table 7 presents analogous results based 
on the inflation rate, the tax rate and the expenditure rate. Finally, 
Table 8 reports the results of regressing total taxes on total expenditure, 
and the tax rate on the expenditure rate. Following the suggestion by 
Engle and Granger (1987), the cointegration tests are based on the 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). The critical values of the ADF test 
are based on Phillips and Ouliaris (1987), where they derive the asymptot
ic 
distribution of the test for a different number of right-hand variables. 
Notice first, that the positive correlations between seigniorage and 
taxes, seigniorage and expenditure, and taxes and expenditure are present 
for all the ten countries. Also, on the basis of the standard 
The same is trueT-statistics, these correlations are very significant. 
for the correlations between inflation rate, tax rate, and expenditure 
rate. However, we should be cautious in interpreting these statistics whe
n 
Even if these variables moved innon-stationary variables are involved. 
the same direction in the post World War II period, the ADF test rejects 
the hypothesis of cointegration for several of the countries. 
On the basis of these tests, we can divide the ten countries into two 
groups. The countries composing the first group, (Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the U.K.), do not show evidence of cointegration in
 
any of the regressions. However, the second group, (France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland and Italy), provides partial support to the theory. Given
 
that-the regression residuals for the countries for this second group are 
stationary, we can be more confident about the meaningfulness of the 
relationships among revenue variables and between revenue and expenditure 
variables. It is possible, however, that the stationarity of the residua
l 
of the seigniorage regressions for Ireland, Italy or Germany, is simply a 
consequence of the fact that the dependent variable is, indeed, stationary
. 
The evidence in this second group, even if more favorable, is not 
homogeneous. In general, the hypothesis of cointegration between taxes an
d 
expenditure receives less support than the cointegration between 
seigniorage and expenditure. The result that income taxes have not been 
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cointegrated with expenditure is a surprising and worrying result. It can 
be argued, in fact, that inflation has been used for purposes other than 
seigniorage, and this is responsible for the lack of cointegration with 
caseexpenditure. This argument, however, is much less convincing in the 
of other sources of revenue. The lack of this long run relationship 
between expenditure and taxes raises the question of whether the current 
budget policies are compatible with long run government solvency. We will 
investigate this problem later on in the paper. Another characteristic 
that emerges from the analysis is that the regressions based on total 
seigniorage receive more support than ones based on the rate of inflation. 
This is particularly true for Greece and Italy. 
Once again, the empirical evidence is mixed. For some countries, 
seigniorage has been an important revenue instrument, while, for others, 
there was no consistent inflation tax policy. These results are a cause 
for concern because they indicate that there exists a lack of homogeneity 
in the role of monetary policies among European countries. This is a 
potential source of conflict, especially in forming a common exchange rate 
policy. 
These conclusions are based on a simple benchmark model. In the 
following section we point out the most important simplifications and 
discuss the possible implications of these hypotheses. 
3. Extensions of the Model 
3.1. Variability in Velocity and in the Cost Functions 
The above analysis assumed, in common with Mankiw (1987), that 
velocity is fixed over time. Changes in velocity, however, might affect 
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the desirability of seigniorage as a source of revenue. In general, in 
fact, it is optimal to have a higher level of seigniorage in periods of low 
velocity. Ignoring these movements in velocity may introduce bias in the 
estimates. For example, increases in seigniorage induced by increases in 
expenditure might have been offset by decreases induced by increases in 
velocity. In equation (2.12), for example, this is equivalent to a 
decrease in m. 
As Table 9 shows, important changes in velocity occurred during the 
period under investigation. Two distinct patterns emerge. A first group 
of countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the U.K.) has 
experienced a pronounced decrease in the ratios of monetary base to output. 
We believe that this tendency is the consequence of the innovations in the 
financial markets that greatly reduced the use of monetary base in 
transactions in the last 30 years. The other group, (composed of Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain), does not show the same negative trend. 
On the contrary, Spain and Greece exhibit, if anything, a positive trend. 
What is interesting is the almost identical composition of these two 
groups and the groups based on the cointegration results. With the 
exception of France, the countries that experienced a strong positive trend 
in velocity are also the ones for which the cointegration properties are 
absent. Similarly, the countries for which the evidence of cointegration 
was stronger, are also the ones (with the exception of Spain) in which the 
ratio of monetary base and output remained relatively high. 
It is likely that the increase in velocity has induced a shift in the 
seigniorage policies of those countries, with inflation tax losing much of 
its importance. In addition to the recent developments in the financial 
markets, other factors contributed to the diverse behavior of velocity 
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among the European countries. Giavazzi (1987) suggests that government 
policies, by altering the reserve requirements of the commercial banks, had 
a major impact on the demand for monetary base. In fact, Greece, Spain, 
Italy and Germany are the countries that, in 1986, had the highest 
reserves-to-deposit ratio. 6 These differences in reserve requirements are 
possible, at the moment, because of the existence of capital controls which 
reduce the international competition among commercial banks. The 
unifications of the European capital markets, however, will require the 
of seigniorageharmonization of these regulations. At that point, the use 
will be greatly compromised. Another strong hypothesis that is used to 
obtain the relationship between seigniorage and taxes like (2.5) or (2.12), 
is that the cost functions c (-) and c 2
(-) have been assumed to be constant 
1 
over time. While it is difficult to model the way in which these cost 
functions may have changed, we cannot rule out this possibility. By 
inducing shifts between the use of seigniorage and the use of income 
taxation, the occurrence of changes in the relative costs of the two tax 
instruments tends to reduce the significance of the (positive) relationship 
linking them. Moreover, if the process driving the relative cost (e.g. 
b /b in equation (2.5)) has a unit root, then by estimating it with a 1 2 
constant we will be introducing a non-stationary component in the residual. 
This will lead to a failure to detect cointegration between seigniorage and 
income tax revenues. A similar argument applies to equation (2.12) with 
the addition that velocity (1/m) might also have been a unit root process. 
3.2. Seigniorage vs. Fixed Exchange Rates 
In our basic model, we implicitly assumed that the monetary 
to choose any level of seigniorage.authorities were potentially free 
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This approach, however, fails to consider a crucial element in the 
monetization decisions, i.e. the exchange rate regime. In fact, a fixed 
exchange rate system imposes serious constraints on the ability of 
governments to independently set the level of inflation. Given that a 
country values a stable exchange rate, it may be willing to suffer the cost 
of a suboptimal use of the inflation tax. These are important 
considerations since most of the observations in our data set refer to 
periods of fixed or controlled exchange rates: Bretton-Woods first and the 
EMS later on. 
A simple way to model this idea is to introduce into the government 
loss function an additional term which penalizes the variance of inflation 
(around the mean level of the system or around the level of a leader 
country). We may think of this as the costs associated with devaluations 
and switches to flexible exchange rates and with the resulting increase in 
volatility of the real exchange rate. We can rewrite the fiscal authority 
problem as: 
P-3 min 
s.t. + (l+r)BI (~11 j {r . yt+J· + 1rt+J· m yt+J·} t-j=O I+r) t+J 
where 1rt* is the inflation rate in the leader country in the system (e.g. US 
l 
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before 1971 and Germany after 1979). From the first order conditions, it 
is easily obtained: 
* The larger the cost of deviating from ~t' the smaller the correlation 
between ~t and rt. In the limiting case of b ➔oo· ~ =~* It is clear that3 . t t' 
unless b is very small, we may introduce a serious bias if we omit ~t from 3 
the regression. 
Table 10 reports the results of adding the inflation rate of the 
* 
leader country as an explanatory variable. ~twas chosen to be the US 
inflation rate up to 1971, except for Ireland where U.K. inflation was used 
for the whole sample. After 1971, * the German~twas switched to be 
inflation rate, except for Greece and Spain for which US inflation rate was 
still used. Also, it is important to verify that, for the U.S., the 
inflation rate has a unit root. If U.S. inflation were stationary, we 
would not have any hope to induce stationarity in the residuals by adding 
it as a regressor. Tests analogous to the one performed in the previous 
sections could not reject the unit root hypothesis. Cointegration is 
accepted for France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the U.K., suggesting 
that, for these countries, the exchange rate system may have been a serious 
constraint to the seigniorage policies. In this respect, the experience of 
Germany and the U.K. is very revealing. In both cases, the positive 
correlation between seigniorage and taxes disappears. This can be 
interpreted as an 
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rate policies over seigniorageindication of the priority of exchange 
policies in these two countries. 
4. Is Mr. Ponzi Really Dead? Solvency and Fiscal Reforms 
Suppose that, regardless of the results obtained in the previous 
sections, we believe that seigniorage has not played, at least since the 
SO's, any significant role in the conduct of monetary policies in Europe. 
Could we then conclude that seigniorage is not a serious threat to exchange 
rate stability and to the existence of the EMS? A problem with this point 
of view is that it neglects to consider the current status of the various 
governments' finances in the Community. Many economists believe that 
several of the countries in our sample are not following fiscal policies 
which are sustainable in the long run. Sooner or later these countries 
will have to undertake budget adjustments which may well involve resorting 
to seigniorage revenues. While it is true that inflation does not need to 
be part of a fiscal reform, the existence of domestic political constraints 
on the use of alternative sources of revenues may make seigniorage 
indispensable. 
In this section we present results of econometric tests designed to 
determine whether the idea that some European countries are following 
potentially insolvent fiscal policies, is indeed founded. 
Consider the government budget constraint at time T+l: 
(3.1) 
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where Rt+l are total revenues (i.e. taxes plus seigniorage). Taking the 
expectations at time t, and by recursive substitutions, we obtain: 
(3.2) 
In order for the budget constraint to hold, it must be true that: 
(_!_] j Blim E 0 (3.3)
t I+rJ t+j
j ➔co 
This is the usual condition which says that the stock of debt cannot 
increase faster than the government borrowing rate. Condition (3.3) 
implies, as noted by Mccallum (1984), and Hamilton and Flavin (1986), that 
a constant deficit inclusive of interest payments is consistent with 
intertemporal solvency. In this case, in fact: 
(j + t)K + BO (3.4) 
where K is the constant size of the deficit, so that condition (3.3) is 
satisfied. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) test the intertemporal budget 
constraint for the U.S. in the period 1962-84. Using a deterministic 
bubble test of the kind proposed by Flood and Garber (1980), they conclude 
that the US "government budget historically has been balanced in expected 
present value terms" (p. 809). 
More recently, Trehan and Walsh (1987) have employed a similar test, 
closer in spirit to the ones employed in the previous sections of this 
paper. The intuition behind this test is quite simple. The condition of a 
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constant deficit (inclusive of interest payments) is extended in a 
stochastic environment to the one of the deficit being a stationary 
variable. More specifically, suppose that the vector zt = (Gt Rt) follows 
a process given by: 
(3.5) 
where Lis the lag operator, a is a vector of constants, A(L) is a 2x2 
matrix of polynomials in L, and Et is a vector of white noise innovations. 
The process (3.5) implies that, consistent with our data, Gt and Rt must be 
differenced once in order to induce stationarity. Under this condition, 
Trehan and Walsh (1987) show that the necessary and sufficient condition 
for the budget to be intertemporally balanced is that the first difference 
of the stock of debt, i.e. the deficit inclusive of interest payments, is 
stationary. They also test this condition for the U.S., on a longer sample 
than Hamilton and Flavin (1986), and they reach the same conclusion. 
Table 11 presents the unit root tests for the deficits of the ten 
European countries. The non-stationarity of the deficit is rejected only 
for the U.K. and, at a lower level of confidence, for Germany and possibly 
Denmark. For the other countries, this analysis suggests that the current 
budget policies will have to be revised if intertemporal balance has to be 
guaranteed. Even if, given the small sample size, these results should be 
some of theseinterpreted with caution, they definitely indicate that for 
countries the temptation to repudiate their European commitments, even by 
reintroducing controls on the capital markets or by abandoning the defense 
of their exchange rate parity, may become very strong. 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper, based on the experience of ten European countries, we 
tried to understand the relevance of seigniorage revenues in the recent 
past, and speculate about their importance in the near future. A first 
conclusion is that the members of the European Community differ widely in 
the way they manage monetary policies. At a first level of approximation, 
we divided the countries into two groups. For the first group, composed of 
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and the U.K., we could not 
identify a consistent seigniorage policy. However, for the countries of 
the second group (France, Ireland, Italy, Germany and Greece), seigniorage 
appears to have been an important component of their financing policies. 
This lack of consensus about the role of monetary policies is a potential 
source of conflict in designing common exchange rate policies. 
A formal analysis of the current status of the finances of the 
governments of the ten European countries revealed that several of them are 
now following budget policies that are potentially incompatible with their 
long run solvency. This also represents a major obstacle toward monetary 
unification on exchange rate stability. Member countries will be faced 
with quite different needs for revenues and eliminating a (politically) 
flexible instrument like seigniorage may result in an unstable situation. 
This problem is likely to become more acute in the near future since, with 
the dismantling of capital controls, other forms of taxation which 
intrinsically depended on the segmentation of capital markets, will have to 
disappear. In the periods of social conflict which are likely to 
characterize times of fiscal reforms, the temptation to resort to 
seigniorage and thus either reintroduce capital controls or abandon the 
exchange rate parity, may become very strong. 
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What is going to be the future of the exchange rate system in Europe? 
In what direction should we move? One possibility is the return to a free 
float. Recent experience, however, has generated widespread skepticism 
about the desirability of such an arrangement. There exists a fear that 
movements of the nominal exchange rate are dominated by speculative 
bubbles, and thus that they may induce market responses that are unrelated 
to economic fundamentals. It is contended that a higher exchange rate 
variability may also induce inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. 
McKinnon (1988), for example, argues that in a world where markets are 
highly incomplete, forward markets alone cannot provide sufficient 
insurance against exchange rate risk, especially for long term irreversible 
investments. But, more fundamentally, a return to a free float is in 
contradiction with the goal of a European monetary unification. 
Another extreme possibility is the switch to an irrevocable fixed 
exchange rate system. At the moment, however, there do not seem to exist 
the proper conditions for a tightening of the EMS bands and for the 
implementation of a strictly fixed exchange rate system. During the next 
few years, the top priority of several member countries will be the 
correction of their public finances. This will probably involve major 
adjustments in their fiscal and monetary policies. What should be avoided 
is the forcing of a country out of the EMS because it imposed constraints 
that were too rigid to be compatible with its domestic policies. 
Practicable fiscal adjustments may require several realignments in the 
exchange rate parities. This, however, need not to imply the end of the 
EMS. What is important is that these realignments occur without major 
speculative activities which may interfere with a smooth processes of 
evenintegration. A way to guarantee the flexible management of the EMS, 
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in the absence of capital controls, has been suggested by Grilli and 
Alesina (1987). This would involve the expansion of the inter-country 
credit facilities and the formal commitment to large short term loans to 
central banks who come under the danger of a speculative attack. 
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Appendix 
The data are from the International Monetary Fund IFS tape: 
(1) Monetary Base line 14 
*(2) Government Revenues line 81 
(3) Government Expenditure* line 82 
(4) Nominal GNP line 99A 
(5) Real GNP line 99A.P 
(6) Nominal GDP line 99B 
(7) Real GDP line 99B.P 
(8) Price Level line (4)/(5) or (6)/(7) 
* France data, not available from the IFS, are from the OECD National 




1950-70 71-78 79-86 50-86 
Belgium 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.05 
Denmark 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.07 
France 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.07 
Germany 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 
Greece 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.10 
Ireland 0.04 0.14 0.11 0.08 
Italy 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.10 
Netherlands 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.05 
Spain 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.12 
United Kingdom 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.07 
Mean 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.07 




1950-70 71-78 79-86 1950-86 
Belgium 0.24 0.29 0.41 0.30 
Denmark 0.19 0.33 0.41 0.27 
France 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.41 
Germany 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.21 
Greece 0.18 0.23 0.31 0.22 
Ireland 0.29 0.40 0.50 0.36 
Italy 0.15 0.26 0.37 0.23 
Netherlands 0.25 0.30 0.39 0.29 
Spain 0.12 0.21 0.29 0.19 
United Kingdom 0.28 0.35 0.40 0.32 
Mean 0.22 0.31 0.39 0.28 
Standard Deviation 0.076 0.069 0.074 0.068 
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Table 3 
UNIT ROOT TESTS: 
Phillips-Perron Z a 
TAXES 








































































































































z,, tests H0 : yt = a+yt-l + et against H1 : yt =a+ (t-T/2) + pyt-l 
+ €t; Ip l<l 
The number in parenthesis indicates the confidence level with which, 




UNIT ROOT TESTS: SEIGNIORAGE 
Phillips-Perron Z Z and Z 








































































































































UNIT ROOT TESTS: EXPENDITURE 

































































































































COINTEGRATION TEST: TOTAL SEIGNIORAGE AND TOTAL TAXES 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER 
R2C T ADF 
Belgium -2.53 1.32 0.49 2.44 
(3.62) (5.24) 
Denmark -1. 27 0.68 0.38 1. 58 
(4.76) (4.68) 
France -2.42 1. 20 0.59 5.06' 
(4.88) (6.88) 
Germany -4.39 2.07 0.27 5.09 
(3.34) (3.55) 
Greece -4. 70 2.47 0.78 4.25 
(8.87) (10.60) 
Ireland -5.86 2.29 0.23 4.05 
(2.82) (3.51) 
Italy -10. 27 2.85 0.25 3.59 
(2.52) (3.30) 
Netherlands -3.23 1. 66 0.09 2.34 
(2.30) (2.10) 
Spain --0. 96 0.94 0.74 2.68 
(2.38) (7.70) 
U.K. -1.94 1.05 0.21 1. 95 
(3.43) (3.21) 
Notes: The ADF tests the hypothesis of no-cointegration. High values of 
ADF reject the hypothesis. Critical values for one explanatory 
variable are (Phillips--Ouliaris (1987)): 
Confidence level: 0.01 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.10 
Critical value: 3.94 3.49 3.34 3.16 3.05 
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Table 6B 
COINTEGRATION TEST: TOTAL SEIGNIORAGE AND TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER 





















































COINTEGRATION TEST: INFLATION RATE AND TAX RATE 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER 


















































0.01 1. 56 
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Table 7B 
COINTEGRATION TEST: INFIATION AND EXPENDITURE RATE 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER 





















































COINTEGRATION TEST: TOTAL TAXES AND TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER 





















































COINTEGRATION TEST: TAX RATE AND EXPENDITURE RATE 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER 
C g R2 ADF 
Belgium -0.26 0.66 0.91 2. 72 
(12.11) (17.00) 
Denmark -0.10 0.81 0.97 3.01 
(6.60) (32.34) 
France -0.09 0.81 0.92 2.43 
(5.33) (19.20) 
Germany -0.04 0.97 0.96 3.42 
(1. 52) (28.79) 
Greece -0. 32 0.61 0.92 3.86 
(14. 96) (18.81) 
Ireland -0.19 0.82 0.94 3.46 
(11.79) (24.30) 





Netherlands -0.20 0.64 0.89 3.43 
(9.73) (16.93) 
Spain -0.10 0.89 0.98 0.86 
(4.19) (28.68) 




MONETARY BASE - GDP RATIO 
1950 1958 1968 1978 1986 
Belgium 26.7 23.1 17.6 11.8 8.1 
Denmark 11.6 10.7 8.4 3.9 4.7 
6.1France 16.9 15.1 13.6 7.2 
Germany 11.8 11. 7 10.1 11. 2 9 .4 
Greece 8.8* 11.6 18.2 18.4 18.2 
Ireland 15.9 14.4 16.8 15.3 10.2 
Italy 16.5 16.5 21.8 15.4 
Netherlands 17.3 15.1 10.3 6.6 7.6 
Spain 14.5** 13.3 12.3 12.1 19.8 
U.K. 13.5 10.9 9.4 6.7 4.2 
* This number corresponds to Greece 1953 
** This number corresponds to Spain 1952 
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Table 10 
COINTEGRATION TEST: EXCHANGE RATE CONSTRAINT 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER 






















































































SOLVENCY CONSTRAINT: DEFICIT INCLUSIVE OF INTEREST PAYMENT 
z z 
a µ 
Belgium 0.83 --0. 50 
(<90) (<90) 
Denmark --6. 62 --6.67 
(<90) (<90) 
France 0.64 --0. 61 
(<90) (<90) 
Germany -8.47 --9. 78 
(>95) (<90) 
Greece 1. 34 -1.46 
(<90) (<90) 
Ireland 1.03 --0.47 
(<90) ( 90) 
Italy 0.56 -2.20 
(<90) (<90) 
Netherlands -1.12 -2.16 
(<90) (<90) 
Spain -2.34 0.36 
(<90) (<90) 




1 The title of this section was inspired by the title of Mundell (1973). 
2 Even if not done here, it is possible to derive these type of cost 
function from more fully specified general equilibrium models. See Grilli 
(1988). 
3 See Trehan and Walch (1987) for a formal derivation. 
4 Different measures of seigniorage can be found in the literature. The 
most common are the inflation rate multiplied by real cash balances, the 
rate of growth of monetary base multiplied by real cash balances, and the 
nominal interest rate multiplied by real cash balances. Drazen (1985), 
provides a general measure of seigniorage which produces most of the 
popular measures as special cases. 
5 Equations are not exactly true since, in general, Cov(rt' yt) and 
Cov(~t' Yt) are not zero. 
6 See Giavazzi (1987). 
